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REMITTING PARTIES' CROSS-APPEAL
should be allowed to relate back to the "original pleading" to avoid the
bar of the statute. "[I]t is a natural and salutary development to toll
the statute of limitations on all causes of action arising out of the trans-
action initially pleaded, regardless of legal theory."44
C. H. POPE
Civil Procedure-Remittitur-Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal
With its recent decision in Mulkerin v. Somerset Tire Service, Inc.1
New Jersey allied itself with Wisconsin' in permitting a plaintiff who had
accepted remittitur in the trial court to obtain appellate review of the
lower court's determination of the damage issue by means of a cross-appeal.
In so doing, New Jersey broke with widely accepted precedent at common
law which denies all opportunities to the remitting party to complain on
appeal.3 Although four states currently provide the remitting party with
some method for review by statute or rule of civil procedure,4 only Wis-
"McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 203(e) (Mc-
Kinney 1963).
1 110 N.J. Super. 173, 264 A.2d 748 (App. Div. 1970).
2 See, e.g., Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130
(1963).8 Conlin v. Southern Pac. R.R. 182 P. 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Sergeant
v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 52 N.W.2d 86 (1952); Iron R.R. v.
Mowrey, 36 Ohio St. 418 (1881).
'NEB. REv. STAr. § 25-1929 (1943):
Whenever the court shall direct a remittitur in any action, and the same is
made, and the party for whose benefit it is made shall appeal said action,
then the party remitting shall not be barred from maintaining that the re-
mittitur should not have required either in whole or in part.
N.Y. Civ. PR.Ac. LAw § 5501 (McKinney 1963):
(a) An appeal from a final judgment brings up for review:
5. a verdict after a trial by jury as of right, when the final judgment was
entered in a different amount pursuant to the respondent's stipulation
on a motion to set aside the verdict as excessive or inadequate; the
appellate court may increase such judgment to a sum not exceeding the
verdict or reduce it to a sum not less than the verdict.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955):
In all jury trials had in civil actions, after the verdict has been rendered,
and on motion for a new trial, when the trial judge is of the opinion that the
verdict in favor of a party should be reduced, and a remittitur is suggested
by him on that account, with the proviso that in case the party in whose favor
the verdict has been rendered refuses to make the remittitur a new trial
will be awarded, the party in whose favor such verdict has been rendered
may make such remittitur under protest, and appeal from the action of the
trial judge to the Court of Appeals; and if, in the opinion of said Court of
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consin and New Jersey offer this oppotrunity by judicial action. This
note will explore the implications of the Wisconsin rule' as adopted by
New Jersey and compare its effects with both the general rule0 and those
statutory or procedural schemes which allow the successful party to chal-
lenge the trial court's decision regarding the excessiveness of the original
verdict.
Mulkerin involved a suit for personal injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff, an elderly patron of the defendant's service station, who fell in the
station's icy driveway. On her claim for negligence the jury awarded her
damages of forty-eight thousand dollars, and her husband, fifty-five
hundred dollars on his per quod claim. Believing this award to be excessive,
the trial court granted a conditional new trial on damages, subject to
being defeated if the plaintiff would accept a ten thousand dollar re-
mittitur.7 Mrs. Mulkerin consented and judgment was entered from which
the defendant took an appeal. Following the defendant's lead, Mrs. Mulker-
in then cross-appealed from the court's action in remitting ten thousand
dollars of her verdict.'
In deciding that Mrs. Mulkerin should be given the right to cross-
appeal, the court relied heavily on the practical benefits offered by re-
mittitur. Pointing out that a plaintiff's acceptance of remittitur is in-
fluenced by his desire to avoid the delay, expense and risk incident to a
new trial or an appeal, the court reasoned that these objectives are frus-
Appeals, the verdict of the jury should not have been reduced, but that the
judgment of the trial court is correct in other respects, the case shall be
reversed to that extent, and judgment shall be rendered in the Court of
Appeals for the full amount originally awarded by the jury in the trial court.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 328:
New trials may be granted when the damages are manifestly too small or
too large, provided that whenever a court shall direct a remittitur in any
action, and the same is made, and the party for whose benefit it is made shall
appeal in said action, then the party remitting shall not be barred from
contending in the appellate court that said remittitur should not have been
required either in whole or in part, and if the appellate court sustains such
contention it shall render such judgment as the trial court should have
rendered without respect to said remittitur.
Because the decision in Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120
N.W.2d 130 (1963), preceded the Mudkerin holding by seven years, the rule that a
remitting party may cross-appeal for review of the reduced verdict will be referred
to as the Wisconsin rule throughout this note.
'In the interest of simplicity, the rule which denies a plaintiff who has accepted
remittitur the right to challenge the trial court's determination on appeal will be
referred to as the general rule.
110 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 749.8Id. at -, 264 A.2d at 749.
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trated when the party for whose benefit the remittitur was ordered
appeals. 9 In such a case the plaintiff loses the advantages of his acceptance
since he is forced to defend the trial court's decision on liability. The
attempt at judicial economy is also frustrated by the increased calendar
congestion caused by the defendant's appeal. Like the Wisconsin court in
Plesko v. City of Milwaukee,"0 the court in Mulkerin concluded that basic
ideas of fairness argue against a defendant's receiving the benefits of both
a reduced verdict and an opportunity to appeal on all issues without risking
a reinstatement of the original verdict.':
The pragmatic approach of the Wisconsin rule appears most equitable
when compared to the harsh simplicity of the general rule. This is not
to say, however, that the general rule is without logical basis. Whether
phrasing the nonappealability in terms of waiver,' 2 estoppel,' 3 or lack of
standing,'4 the common thread running through the decisions is the
theory that one may not appeal from a judgment to which he has con-
sented."'
In reaching this analogy with consent judgments in general, the courts
follow a fairly uniform scheme of analysis. An examination of their
decisions indicates that remittitur is considered to serve a dual function:
First, it is the equivalent of a certificate, that, in the opinion of the court,
the original verdict cannot be supported.' 6 Second, it represents an option
offered out of fairness to the verdict winner to save him the difficulties
incident to a second trial. In suggesting that he remit the excessive
portion of his recovery, the court provides the plaintiff with an opportunity
9 Id. at -, 264 A.2d at 750.
10 19 Wis. 2d at 221, 120 N.W.2d at 135.
" 110 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 750.
"E.g., San Bernadino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618, 67 P. 1047
(1902) ; Plinsky v. Nolan, 65 Ore. 402, 133 P. 71 (1913).
"sE.g., Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Buckles, 83 Fla. 599, 92 So. 159 (1922);
McDaniel v. Hancock, 328 Mich. 78, 43 N.W.2d 68 (1950); Martin v. Jansen, 113
Wash. 290, 193 P. 674 (1920).
"E.g., Gough v. Halperin, 306 Pa. 230, 159 A. 447 (1932) ; accord, Clarkson
v. Crawford, 285 Pa. 299, 132 A. 350 (1926).
"E.g., City of Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 65 So. 2d 160 (1953);
Andres v. Green, 7 Ill. App. 2d 375, 129 N.E.2d 430 (1955) ; Los Angeles & S.L.R.
Co. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123 P.2d 224 (1942) ; Fleming v. Smouse, 73 W. Va.
188, 80 S.E. 144 (1913).
" Ralston v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 267 Pa. 278, 284, 110 A. 336, 338
(1920). Although remittitur is not proper where the verdict is influenced by passion
or prejudice so as to affect the issue of liability, it may be used in this first function
to correct a verdict which is merely excessive. Comment, Rernittitur: Or the Law
of Diminishing Returns, 24 TENN. L. Rnv. 1155, 1159 (1957)., "Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 437 Pa. 143, -, 262 A.2d 665, 669 (1970).
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to prevent the expense and delay of further litigation. At the same time
the court saves itself valuable time and the risk that the same result might
again obtain when the case is retried. By construing the order which
grants the new trial in conditional terms, the plaintiff is given the privilege
of retaining that portion of the verdict not deemed excessive and defeating
the defendant's demand for a new trial.18
It is in this second function of remittitur that the courts which follow
the general rule find the basis for their argument. They observe that while
a plaintiff has no claim to remittitur as a matter of right, neither can it be
forced upon him without his assent.19 If he is dissatisfied he may reject
the remittitur and either proceed to a second trial or, in many cases, take
an appeal from the order which granted the new trial.20 In either case he
will be faced with the same situation as if there had been no suggestion
for him to remit in the first place." The argument concludes that when
the plaintiff files his acceptance, he has made an election to which he is
bound.22 Any subsequent assertion that he is entitled to more would be
wholly inconsistent with his prior election to accept the reduced amount in
full satisfaction of his claim against the defendant.'
It is arguable, though, that the limited options available under the
general rule may not always provide the plaintiff with a viable means of
protecting his self-interest. From his viewpoint, the dilemma may take
on the following character: If he accepts the reduction in verdict, then
he consents to receive an amount which he deems inadequate. If he rejects
the reduction without appealing the order which granted the new trial,
then he must undergo the time and expense of a second trial with the risk
18 Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 916, 245 S.W.2d 96, 105
(1952).
" Compare Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 437 Pa. 143, -, 262 A.2d 665, 669
(1970) with Andres v. Green, 7 Ill. App. 2d 375, 384, 129 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1955)
and Alabama & V. Ry. v. Davis, 69 Miss. 444, 451, 13 So. 693, 695 (1891).
"0 Generally, the discretion of the trial court in ruling on a motion for a new
trial based on excessiveness of damages is subject to review or reversal, but only
for a clear abuse or arbitrary exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Prosser v. Richman,
133 Conn. 253, 50 A.2d 85 (1946) ; Thomas v. Fleming, 241 Miss. 26, 128 So. 2d
854 (1961); Dodd v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 354 Mo. 1205, 193 S.W.2d
905 (1946). Cf. Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongfil
Death Cases, 12 DFFENSE L.J. 521, 528 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Busch]. But
see Andres v. Green, 7 Ill. App. 2d 375, 129 N.E.2d 430 (1955), in which it is sug-
gested that there is no right of appeal in this situation.
2 Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 437 Pa. 143, -, 262 A.2d 665, 669 (1970).
22E.g., Dargis v. Maguire, 156 So. 2d 897, 898 (Fla. App. 1963) ; Iron R.R. v.
Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418, 423 (1881). In both of these cases the plaintiffs' accep-
tance, through reluctantly or conditionally given, was deemed to have been absolute.
28 Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 437 Pa. 143, -, 262 A.2d 665, 668 (1970).
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that he may again be forced to accept what he believes to be an inadequate
verdict. If he is able to appeal the order which granted the new trial, he
must not only defend his position against all other grounds asserted in
the defendant's motion, but he must also defend the reasonableness of the
original verdict, even though he may consider it excessive in some amount.
This latter problem becomes especially acute when the reduction amounts
to a high precentage of the original verdict.24
Only Tennessee meets this problem head-on by enabling the plaintiff
to accept the remittitur under protest and then appeal directly from the
action of the trial court. 5 Despite its obvious benefit to the plaintiff, this
method provides no incentive to achieve finality at trial because the
plaintiff's right to appeal is completely independent of the defendant's
action following judgment in the lower court. In contrast, the Wisconsin
rule encourages the defendant to make a considered appraisal of the merits
of his appeal prior to seeking review.2 6 Since the plaintiff's right to
appellate review is limited to cross-appeal, the defendant tends to think
twice before appealing and thereby opening the door to the higher court
for the palintiff. Like the Wisconsin rule, statutes in Nebraska27 and
New York2" and a Texas rule of civil procedure29 also encourage such
judicial economy. At the same time they also provide some alleviation to
the dilemma outlined in the previous paragraph in the event the defendant
initiates the appeal process.
At first blush, the reasoning of the Wisconsin rule appears to be
eminently fair. Implicit in its holding, however, is the basic notion of an
appellate tribunal's competence in the area of damage determination-an
assumption which is subject to some question.30 Although higher courts
have in the past found justification for imposing remittitur in the "economic
-1 Id. at -, 262 A.2d at 669. In Corabi, a suit for libel, slander, unfair competi-
tion and invasion of privacy, the plaintiffs' verdict had been reduced by sixty per
cent in the trial court. Rather than face the problems of a second trial or be forced
to defend the reasonableness of the original verdict on appeal, the plaintiffs accepted
the remittitur. The acceptance, however, was conditioned by the statement that they
retained whatever rights they might have had to seek appellate review. The court
had little sympathy for their dilemma and held that the conditional acceptance
amounted to an absolute rejection.
5 TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 27-118, -119 (1955). See note 4 supra.
" See 110 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 750.
" NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1929 (1943). See note 4 supra.
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5501 (McKinney 1963). See note 4 supra.
"' Tax. R. Civ. P. 328. See note 4 supra.
"o See Busch 521; Conklin, Appellate Courts and the Quest for Just Com-
pensation, 42 N.D.L. Rnv. 397 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Conldin].
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aspects of justice," 31 the practical expertise of the appellate judges8 2 and
the need for uniform awards in comparable cases, 33 such reasoning cannot
discount the fact that the only criterion for determination before the court
is the cold statement of the trial record. Demeanor evidence and indica-
tions of a jury compromise, often invaluable to the trial judge in assessing
the supportability of the original award, are totally absent at the appellate
level. For this reason some degree of judicial restraint appears to be
necessary, lest the higher courts find themselves embroiled in the sort of
particularization best served at the trial level. As stated by Professor
Conklin,
[L]ower courts sit to resolve all controversies which come within their
jurisdiction because the alternative is chaos. Appellate tribunals sit to
render principled judgment of more general applicability by reviewing
what has already been authoritatively determined at an inferior level.
When appellate courts become activists and particularists they risk the
danger of fomenting the primordeal chaos which the lower courts seek
to order initially and, usually, quite adequately.
4
The degree of restraint actually exercised in this situation is necessarily
dependent on the scope of review which the court adopts. The court in
Plesko held that the trial judge's determination would not be disturbed
unless it amounted to an abuse of discretion.", Although Mulkerin estab-
lished no specific test by which to judge future cases, its language is
strongly suggestive of the Plesko standard., Sinde remittitur is a dis-
" Conklin 399. He defines this term as "an attempt to do substantial justice in
the shortest time possible."
2 The point of interference is not fixed on the caprice of judicial individ-
ualism; it is rather arrived at by a synthesis of all the experience that the
judge has had: in the beginning as a law student, in the later controversies of
law practice, in the hearing of cases and the writing of decisions, in the sum
of all that he has observed in the courtroom and the library.
Mann v. Hunt, 283 App. Div. 140, -, 126 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (1953).
" See, e.g., Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 918, 245
S.W.2d 96, 107 (1952). For views doubting the validity of such justification see
Busch at 542 and Hooker, The Adequate Award: Tennessee Trends, 23 TENN. L.
REv. 760 (1955).
", Conklin 403.
19 Wis. 2d at 221-22, 120 N.W.2d at 135.
8 In light of defense counsel's argument before us,.., we have the impression
that he never seriously questioned the extent of Mrs. Mulkerin's injuries.
If the remittitur was imposed by the court to mould the amount of Mrs.
Mulkerin's verdict because of the foreman's statement that they gave her
"wages for six years thirty thousand dollars; pain and anguish eighteen
REMITTING PARTIES' CROSS-APPEAL
cretionary tool,37 such a standard appears to be the only reasonable form
of verbalization. Nevertheless, the phrase "judicial discretion" has a
tendency to produce some confusion in practice. "This phrase, though
possessing some connotation of restriction, could well be likened unto a
seemingly boundless judicial playground compassed about at some distant
point by an irregular fence called propriety."3 8 Although such imprecision
is not uncommon in legal standards, it should be cautiously observed in
this area. The broader the discretion which is invested in the lower courts,
the more likely both they and their juries will be to exert greater care
and competence at the trial level. 39 Only where the appellate court is
convinced that the trial judge acted irrationally in suggesting remittitur
should it interfere; if reasonable men could differ, the higher court should
affirm.40
Although Plesko forged the theoretical break with the general rule,
it remained for Mulkerin to declare that an actual abuse of discretion had
occurred.4 1 In so doing, the court restored the original verdict without
considering other possible amounts. In view of the general recognition of
the power of state appellate courts to impose remittitur and additur in the
first instance,2 it can be assumed that, had the court in Mulkerin wished
to restore less than the full amount, it could have done so without difficulty.
Although the court may have had the ability to restore less than the full
amount, this fact alone does not solve the problem of precisely what stan-
dard should be used in determining the recovery allowed. The court
leaves unanswered whether they shall, in the future, look to the greatest
amount a reasonable jury could have awarded, the smallest amount, or
somewhere in between. It is arguable that New Jersey's adoption of the
Wisconsin rule will carry with it adherence to the standard observed by
the Wisconsin courts. In Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co. 43 the Wisconsin
court rejected their previous yardstick of "the lowest amount for which
thousand dollars," the court's action cannot be sustained. He made a sub-
stantive determination that was solely the jury's province.
110 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 750.
8 See Hollinger v. York Ry., 225 Pa. 419, 426, 74 A. 344, 345 (1909).




See note 36 supra.
"Conklin 398. See also Southern Nat'l In. Co. v. Williams, 224 Ark, 938, 277
S.W.2d 487 (1955) ; Pitrowski v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 6 Ill. App. 2d 495,
128 N.E.2d 577 (1955).
" 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (i960).
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the court would permit a verdict to stand" 44 and adopted what it considered
to be the majority rule. This latter rule allows the plaintiff to recover
"an amount which the court considers reasonable."45 Although the court's
attention in that case was directed at achieving finality at trial, it would
seem incongruous-and certainly more confusing-to adopt one standard
for trial and another for appeal. In any event, the difficulty in fitting an
exact dollar amount to the standard adopted will be magnified since the
appellate court is one step further removed from the interplay of facts
which give rise to certainty at the trial level.
Assuming that we are safe in attributing to the judiciary a degree of
objectivity, insight and forbearance, then the Wisconsin rule may prove
to be a valuable procedural tool. While not completely foreclosing appellate
review to the remitting party, its limitation of applicability to cross-
appeals tends to discourage frivolous appeals by defendants. In this respect,
it could work to bring finality to more trial court decisions. Its inherent
fairness leaves little room for criticism. Indeed its only defect-if it may
properly be called such-is an underlying faith in the ability of appellate
courts to pass upon damages. With a recognition of their own weaknesses
in this area, however, appellate courts could easily avoid this problem
through a degree of judicial restraint.
WILLIAM W. MAYWHORT
Constitutional Law-State Action-You Can't Take the City Out of
the Park, But You Can Take the Park Out of the City
In 1966 the Supreme Court ruled that Baconsfield Park in Macon,
Georgia, had acquired such "momentum" as a public facility that the
mere changing from trustees who were public officials acting in their
official capacity to private trustees would not dissipate the unconstitutional
state action sufficiently to permit the park to be operated on a segregated
basis.' By 1970 that momentum seemed to have run out. In Evans v.
Abney2 the Court ruled that the decision of the Georgia courts that the
park must revert to the heirs of the testator did not involve sufficient
state action to violate the fourteenth amendment.
" Id. at 90, 102 N.W.2d at 400.
"5 Id.
'Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
2396 U.S. 43.5 (1970).
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